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Three splendid lectures enlivened the year.
Roger Scruton gave a talk on music and
human values to a packed audience at the
Alumni Weekend, bravely overcoming a
distracting balletic performance by the
technician who was apparently needed to
cope with the innovation of showing slides
and music together. As compensation, the
subsequent dinner in Roger’s honour was
ravished by an impromptu performance of
songs from Russia and Kazakhstan, by the
very talented partner of one of our guests. 
Barry Smith’s lecture on the philosophy
of wine-tasting at the Cambridge Festival
of Ideas also saw academic delight
mingled with more sensual pleasure as 
the audience thoughtfully reflected upon
the importance of terroir and knowingly
compared Pinot Noirs. Philip Pettit gave the
Routledge Lecture in Philosophy, offering
us a lucid and illuminating account of 
rival conceptions of liberty, elegantly
juxtaposing such heavyweights as Hobbes,
Berlin, Rawls, Skinner and Ibsen. We owe
thanks to all these speakers, and to
Routledge for their continued support. 
However, the great news this year, 
is that thanks to some very generous 
gifts the Faculty is now on the point 
of meeting the target of £2 million 
required to fund the 1896 Chair of
Philosophy. As I write this, the School 
of Arts and Humanities has passed our
request for the position to be formally
named the Bertrand Russell Professorship 
of Philosophy up to the General Board,
where we expect it to be approved. We
decided that Russell deserved the honour
not only for his intellectual eminence, 
but also for his visibility as a public face 
of philosophy. 
Meeting the goal of this appeal is a
terrific achievement, and one of which 
we in the Faculty, and our alumni, can be
very proud. It is particularly gratifying that
almost one hundred people gave their
support to the cause. The Chair is now
independent of the bitter financial winds
blowing around many posts in academe,
even in Cambridge. Particular thanks are
due to Hugh Mellor and Jane Heal, who
have worked tirelessly on behalf of the
appeal, and to CUDO and Cambridge 
in America, who have ably supported 
us. We are planning to announce a
celebratory event when all the formalities
are complete. 
Of course, needs continue. At present 
we are encouraging donors to think 
of supporting graduate students by
endowing bursaries and grants. This is
urgent, because there is so little public
funding for graduate studies in the
humanities. The subjects that the
Government likes — science, technology,
engineering and medicine—do not
include literature, history, languages or
philosophy. Thanks to one fine gift this 
year we have been able to offer two 
David Bayless studentships. And thanks 
to one extremely generous anonymous
gift, we shall be able to continue to help
some of the best and most deserving
students for another ten years. But more 
is always needed if enough of them 
are going to be able to pass the torch 
to another generation. One of Trinity
College’s alumnus benefactors once 
wrote “I should have as a memorial the
kind thoughts and gratitude of those 
who had been helped by an unknown
friend” and we firmly believe that many
readers would like to share that sentiment. 
Last year in this column, Alex Oliver
talked of the booming demand for places
in philosophy and expressed gratitude 
to colleagues, students, and staff for 
their role in sustaining our Rolls-Royce
education. I am pleased to say that the
demand continues. I also want to end 
by affirming that with ever-increasing
pressures, the gratitude is ever more
appropriate.
From the Chairman
Simon Blackburn
Bertrand Russell
If you have any comments or
suggestions, please send them 
to the Editor:
Mrs Jenni Lecky-Thompson
Faculty of Philosophy
University of Cambridge
Sidgwick Avenue
Cambridge
CB3 9DA
Phone: +44 1223 331889
email: jel52@cam.ac.uk
Suppose you are wondering whether 
to play a game of tennis and decide in
the end against the idea. Did you make 
a free decision? Yes, you think, of course
you did. But now I point out that the gate
to the tennis court was locked: perhaps
even locked by someone who wanted to
make sure you couldn’t play. Are you still
sure that you made a free decision?
Most of us will respond by
distinguishing. Yes, you freely made a
choice between the options you thought
you had. But those options weren’t all
available and so you did not actually
have a free choice between playing 
and not playing tennis. 
This very example was discussed in 
an exchange between Thomas Hobbes
and Bishop Bramhall in the seventeenth
century. Hobbes’s extraordinary view 
was that you really have a free choice if
you are not interfered with in the option
you actually choose. And so he says,
presumably with ‘real’ tennis in mind, 
that ‘it is no impediment...that the door 
is shut’ if you have not ‘a will to play’. 
The Hobbesian way of thinking about
free choice may continue in the theme,
sounded with particular brio by Isaiah
Berlin, that to be free in a choice is not to
suffer interference there. On at least one
reading of this idea you do not suffer
requiring that each option in a choice
should escape interference, but also 
for adopting a more radical position. 
This is the republican claim that even 
a robustly unimpeded choice will be
unfree if it is subject to the permission 
or will of any other. 
Suppose that there is a doorkeeper
guarding the two doors, A and B, but
that they are each open because the
keeper happens to like you. Would you
have a free choice in such a case? An
argument rather like Berlin’s adaptation
argument suggests that you would not. 
Suppose you want A, not B, but door 
A is closed because the door-keeper
does not like you. Now imagine that 
you can secure the goodwill of the 
door-keeper if you toady or fawn or
kowtow appropriately. And imagine 
that you do ingratiate yourself by such
means and that door A becomes as 
open as door B. Does that mean that 
you now have a free choice between 
A and B? 
Surely not. As freedom cannot be
achieved just by adaptation, so it cannot
plausibly be achieved by ingratiation.
Where choice requires the ‘indulgence’ 
of another, as Richard Price put it in the
eighteenth century, it is not properly 
free choice. The thought experiment
argues for the republican view that a
choice is not free if its exercise requires
the permission and goodwill of another.
Freedom consists in not being subject 
to the will of another: not being
dominated by another, as by a master.
It is a nice irony that though Berlin
took Hobbes to be a forerunner of his
views, his arguments go in an extreme
non-Hobbesian direction. Not only does
his open-doors metaphor undermine
Hobbes’s explicit claim, making
counterfactual as well as actual
interference hostile to freedom. It 
also provides support for the view that
the freedom of a choice requires full
independence from the will of another,
thereby sustaining the very ancient,
republican ‘wisdom’ that Hobbes took 
to be too ‘dearly bought’. 
interference in the choice between
playing and not playing tennis if you 
are not impeded in the option you
actually take. 
In his 1958 essay ‘Two Concepts of
Liberty’ Berlin may have gone along 
with this thought but, to his credit, he
explicitly renounced it later, drawing on 
a metaphor of open doors. In order to
enjoy a free choice between certain
options, each option must be an open
door, he said. It is not enough that the
actual door you push on happens to be
open; the counterfactual door you might
have pushed on must have been open
too. You must not be exposed either to
actual or to counterfactual interference. 
Berlin made an interesting case for this
position. Suppose you are faced with two
options or doors, A and B, and only A is
open. If you can adapt your preferences
so as to want A, not B, then on the view
under question you will have ensured
that you have a free choice. But this is
absurd. You cannot make yourself free;
you cannot ensure the freedom of 
a choice, just by adapting your
preferences appropriately.
I like Berlin’s metaphor and I like this
argument. One attractive feature is that
the metaphor has resources not actually
exploited by Berlin. It argues not just for
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Hobbes, Berlin and Freedom
Philip Pettit
Philip Pettit
Philip Pettit is the Laurance S.
Rockefeller Professor of Politics 
and Human Values at Princeton
University. In October 2009 he 
gave the fourth Routledge Lecture 
in Philosophy on the uses of Berlin’s
open-doors metaphor. He also gave
the Seeley Lectures on a republican
conception of democracy on 
26–30 April 2010. 
Although I teach in the Law Faculty at
Cambridge, most of my degrees and 
all of my lecturing, supervisions and
research are philosophical. Two of my
areas of specialization, moral philosophy
and political philosophy are well covered
by the Philosophy Faculty; but my third
area of specialization, legal philosophy,
has largely been left to the Law Faculty
(so far as I am aware, Ross Harrison is 
the only member of the Philosophy
Faculty in recent decades who has
worked on topics in legal philosophy). 
In this respect, Cambridge is similar 
to most other British and American
universities. Though there are a few
exceptions, most universities in the
English-speaking world consign the
philosophy of law predominantly to 
law faculties.
Ironically, the situation just recounted
is due not least to the similarities
between law and philosophy. Like
philosophy, law as an academic
discipline is highly self-reflective 
and concerned with its own history. 
In addition, it sets a premium on
rigorously articulated argumentation 
and on the elaboration of subtle
distinctions. Moreover, major
philosophical issues arise in many 
areas of the law. For example, the 
law of evidence involves many of the
problems with which epistemologists
grapple, and quite a few of the
distinctions drawn in that area of law 
are parallel to those drawn in the
epistemological literature (although
admittedly there are also some salient
differences). It is not surprising then, 
that some distinguished epistemologists
such as Larry Laudan and Susan Haack
have produced important work on
general topics in the law of evidence. 
Because of these affinities between
law and philosophy, the location of 
legal philosophy in law faculties is quite
sensible. Given that both the methods 
of reasoning and the substantive issues
in the philosophy of law are far from
unfamiliar to jurists, the major British 
and American law faculties are natural
homes for the Jurisprudence courses
that are offered under their auspices.
Nonetheless, the philosophy of law 
is indeed a branch of philosophy. It
overlaps substantially with political
philosophy and moral philosophy – 
extent are human activities properly
subject to legal regulation? Who –
legislatures or courts – should have 
the final say in determining whether
people hold fundamental legal rights 
to be treated in certain ways? Is there 
any comprehensively applicable 
moral obligation to comply with legal
requirements? What is the appropriate
general basis for the imposition of
punishments? When can adjudicators
and administrators legitimately deviate
from the requirements of procedural
justice in order to promote the
attainment of substantive justice? 
Though some of these questions 
can be construed as jurisdiction-specific
inquiries, philosophers construe them 
in abstraction from any particular
jurisdiction (even if the philosophers
ultimately conclude that the answers 
to several of these questions can
legitimately vary to some degree 
across jurisdictions). The question 
about punishment illustrates the
complexities of the normative matters
that are pondered by legal philosophers.
I have space to mention only the three
most commonly propounded positions.
Some philosophers take the view that 
a punishment is morally justified insofar
as it deters future criminal activity more
effectively than would any less severe
sanction. Other philosophers contend
that punishments are morally justified
insofar as they are deserved, or insofar 
as they are necessary, to reaffirm the
rights and dignity of victims. Still 
others maintain that punishments are
morally justified insofar as they express 
a community’s revulsion toward various
modes of misconduct.
Several additional positions and
combinations of positions have been
championed over the years, but the
preceding paragraph suffices to convey 
a sense of the multi-facetedness of 
the normative topics that are the foci 
in many of the quarrels among legal
philosophers. To the extent that any
progress is made in tackling those 
topics, it occurs through wide-ranging
disputation. Given that most legal
philosophers have been trained both 
as philosophers and as lawyers, the
numerousness and persistence of the
disagreements among them are amply
predictable!
and, to a lesser extent, with most 
other domains of philosophy – but 
it addresses a number of distinctive
topics and concerns. 
Very roughly, the field can be 
divided into two main components: the
conceptual or theoretical-explanatory
side, and the normative or prescriptive
side. Although there is a considerable
amount of interweaving between those
two categories, they can usefully be
separated for heuristic purposes.
When legal philosophers pursue a
conceptual or theoretical-explanatory
enquiry, they seek to explicate the nature
of some major entity or property that 
is involved in the operations of legal
systems. Perhaps the most famous 
such enquiry concerns the nature of 
law itself. Legal positivists (including me)
have long insisted on the separability of
law and morality. That is, they maintain
that there are no significant necessary
connections between the legal domain
and the moral domain – though there
are typically any number of contingent
connections between those domains. 
In opposition to legal positivists are
natural-law philosophers of many 
stripes, who contend that law and
morality are necessarily linked in
important ways. Debates between
positivists and natural-law thinkers have
loomed large in the philosophy of law 
for centuries, partly because the specific
foci of those debates are multifarious.
(The precise tenor of any claim about 
the relationship between law and
morality depends upon the relevant
contrast class for the moral realm:
morality vs. immorality, morality vs.
prudence, morality vs. descriptive
factuality).
Countless further conceptual or
theoretical-explanatory enquiries in 
legal philosophy pertain to other 
major entities or properties that are
operative in legal systems: rights,
liberties, authority, duties, and so 
forth. However, we should move 
on to the normative or prescriptive
matters that engross legal philosophers.
These matters belong to the domain 
of political philosophy, but, because 
they centrally involve legal institutions,
they are frequently addressed by legal
philosophers as well. Among the issues
of this sort are the following: To what
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Matthew Kramer is Professor of Legal
& Political Philosophy, and a Fellow
of Churchill College.
What is Legal Philosophy?
Matthew H. Kramer
Tim Crane joined the Faculty in
October 2009 as the Knightbridge
Professor of Philosophy. He previously
taught at UCL where he was also Head
of Department. 
SB: Let’s start by asking what your
connection with Cambridge has been
over the years?
TC: My connection with Cambridge goes
back to when I was a graduate student
here in the 80s. And then I worked in
London for 20 years, but I always kept in
touch with the Faculty here and it’s very
exciting to be back and working here 
as professor.
SB: How about your own research
interests: Where do they centre?
TC: Well most of my work so far has 
been in the philosophy of mind. At 
the moment I’ve been working on 
the idea of intentionality, the mind’s
representation of the world, or the 
mind’s direction upon its objects. I’ve
written about different aspects of this
phenomenon of intentionality. In my first
book, I wrote about the intentionality of
mind, and reductive accounts of it,
particularly accounts in terms of
computation and causal processes. 
I’ve become more interested as the
years have gone on in phenomenology
judged was something independent 
of your mind and this was a central 
part of their rejection of idealism. I
suppose I’m so interested in the idea 
of intentionality because I see it
everywhere in philosophy.
SB: Do you think that the study 
of consciousness especially is
undergoing changes, with its fMRI
scanners and so on, which tell us about
the way the brain works? Do you think
this is going to affect your own work 
or the direction of the subject?
TC: I definitely see this as something 
that would affect my own work 
and it already has affected the subject 
in lots of ways. I think one of the 
roles for philosophy here is to pin 
down exactly what it is that we‘re 
talking about when we talk about
‘consciousness’. There are so many 
things that we bring under the 
heading of consciousness and it’s a
serious question whether they have
anything interesting in common. 
We talk about thoughts being
conscious we talk about sensations
being conscious, and about conscious
emotions, moods and reasoning, 
but are these in any way the same
phenomenon? If they are, it doesn’t 
seem that what’s going to explain these
phenomena or bring them together 
is one simple quality. There’s no simple
quality common between thought 
and conscious thought and sensation. 
So I think that’s what philosophy 
needs to work on. And that is definitely
illuminated I think, by what’s going on 
in neuroscience on understanding the
actual functional architecture of the
brain. Let alone more spectacular
discoveries like the recent discovery by
neuroscientists in Cambridge about the
presence of consciousness in patients 
in a persistent vegetative state, which is
an extraordinary discovery which no
philosopher should ignore.
SB: No you can’t go on being a simple-
minded behaviourist if consciousness 
is apparently there in people whose
capacity for behaviour has vanished.
What about your interests in other 
areas of philosophy?
TC: My interests have started to 
move in slightly different directions. 
One is my interest in animal cognition
and the philosophical questions that 
that raises. That’s something I find 
very exciting at the moment and there’s
very interesting research going on in
psychology on animal thought and
communication. Another side of my
and the relationship between
intentionality and consciousness, 
which has taken me towards the 
theory of consciousness, but also
towards Phenomenology with a 
capital P, as it were, especially towards
Husserl and some of his ideas.
So one thing I’m working on at the
moment is a book on thinking about 
the non-existent. This is incredibly
important for the theory of intentionality
because on the face of it, it looks as if 
the general phenomenon of thinking
about something ought to be a relation
between the thinking mind and the
thing thought about, but if relations 
only hold between existing things, 
then how is it possible to think about
something that doesn’t exist? 
SB: Yes the old trouble of non-
existence. That is in a sense, a 
very Cambridge topic, because it
obsessed Russell and I suppose 
it was part of the motivation for 
the theory of descriptions.
TC: That’s right I think, and also I 
suppose Russell and Moore didn’t 
talk about their ideas in terms of
intentionality – they didn’t use those
categories, but the fundamental 
starting point of their philosophy 
was the idea of judgement. What you
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A Conversation with Tim Crane
Interviewed by Simon Blackburn
Tim Crane and Simon Blackburn
interests is metaphysics of perhaps 
a more Aristotelian form. A lot of
metaphysics is dominated by a 
certain kind of unbridled speculation 
at the moment as if you can just say
anything as long as no one’s ever said 
it before and it’s vaguely coherent.
Whereas I think that if there is such a
thing as metaphysics at all, it has to be
related to other things we know from
science and other sources, and to things
that make sense. It’s for that reason that 
I’m interested in the Aristotelian idea 
of substance as a kind of fundamental
unity in things, and I would like to
develop that further and think about
questions of persistence in identity 
over time in relation to these more 
old fashioned categories.
SB: Cambridge, certainly in my young
day, was never a historically orientated
department. Jonathan Bennett was
thought to be slightly eccentric for
being so keen on the history of
philosophy and yet it’s surprising how
again and again it turns out that the
contemporary problems are somehow
echoing the history of the subject. 
TC: That’s true. I was not originally
interested in the question of substance,
but when I had to teach Leibniz at UCL
Future Events
Alumni Weekend 2010
Saturday 25th September
Dr Fraser MacBride will deliver 
a talk on ‘The Dark Matter of
Cambridge Philosophy’. Please 
see the Alumni Weekend website
(www.alumni.cam.ac.uk/weekend) 
for further details.
Festival of Ideas 2010
‘Fiction, Emotion, and Imagination’
Friday 29th October 2010
Dr Cain Todd from Lancaster
University will give a talk on emotional
response to fictional artworks.
Inaugural Lecture: ‘What is
Distinctive about Human
Thought?’
Wednesday 1st December 2010
Professor Tim Crane will give his
inaugural lecture as Knightbridge
Professor.
Routledge Lecture in Philosophy
Tuesday 15th March 2011
Professor Tim Scanlon from Harvard
University will give a lecture entitled
‘Value in Morality and Politics’. 
Further details about these lectures will
be available on the Faculty website.
some years ago, I started thinking about
his idea of substance as something
simple which is a fundamental unity, 
and there seemed something deeply
right about this. Of course it’s a very
unusual view of reality and no one 
thinks that Leibniz’s view could be true,
but nonetheless in thinking about it 
you face questions about the sorts of
things that might be true – and you
avoid errors and you get inspiration 
from engaging with the great thinkers 
of the past. We also learn about why 
we have the problems that we do. So 
I’m all for reading the great thinkers 
of the past – and even the less great
thinkers!
SB: Absolutely. Is there anything else 
you would like to talk about?
TC: I’d just like to say how great it is 
to be back in Cambridge and what a
wonderful academic, intellectual and
pedagogical environment it is. It’s a great
privilege to be here and I look forward 
to being here for many years.
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A podcast of the full conversation 
is available at www.phil.cam.ac.uk.
Awards and Honours
Medieval philosophy scholar Dr 
John Marenbon (Trinity College,
Cambridge) was elected a Fellow of 
the British Academy.
Dr Hallvard Lillehammer has 
won a Pilkington Teaching Prize in
recognition of his excellence in 
teaching at the University.
Professor Onora O’Neill received an
honorary degree from the University 
of York.
Arrivals
Dr Richard Woodward from the
University of Leeds joined the Faculty 
as temporary lecturer in October 2009,
while Dr Arif Ahmed is on research leave.
Dr Niklas Moller (from Sweden) began 
a two year EC Marie Curie Intra-European
Research Fellowship in July 2009, working
on the Philosophy of Risk with Simon
Blackburn.
Research Awards
Dr Michael Potter and Dr Peter 
Smith were each awarded research 
leave from the AHRC for a three month
period for 1st Oct 2009 and 1st April 
2010 respectively. 
Dr Arif Ahmed was awarded a Research
Fellowship from the Leverhulme Trust for
the 2009–10 academic year.
Dr Clare Chambers was awarded a
CRASSH Early Career Research Fellowship
for Easter term 2010. 
Dr Lubomira Radoilska was awarded 
a six month Dissemination Grant by the
Wellcome Trust for her current research
on conceptions of autonomy and
equality in public health.
Dr Mark Sprevak, was awarded a two
year Leverhulme Early Career Research
Fellowship. 
Tom Simpson was awarded a three 
year sponsorship from Microsoft 
Research Ltd for a postgraduate 
research studentship.
Appointments
An impressive number of our graduate
students and Research Fellows have
recently secured jobs in academia.
Among them, Ben Colburn has been
appointed to a lectureship at Glasgow
University. Tom Stern and Jenny Bryan
have been appointed to lectureships 
at UCL, Charlotte Werndl at the London
School of Economics, Mark Sprevak at
Edinburgh and Jules Holroyd at Cardiff. 
Sacha Golob was awarded a Junior
Research Fellowship at Peterhouse,
Cambridge; Laura Biron at Queen’s,
Cambridge; and Tim Button at St 
John’s, Cambridge.
Special Lectures
A large audience came to hear 
alumnus Professor Roger Scruton
(Jesus College 1962–5) give a lively talk 
on ‘Music, Meaning and Morality’ at 
last year’s alumni weekend. Professor
Scruton argued for the moral significance
of music, its place in our culture, and 
the need for taste and discrimination 
in listening to it. A podcast and slides 
of the lecture are available from the
Faculty website.
Last October Professor Simon
Blackburn gave the Presidential 
Address to the Aristotelian Society. 
On 2nd March 2010 Baroness Onora
O’Neill delivered the prestigious Rede
Lecture for 2009–10 on The Two Cultures
Fifty Years On. 
Student Prizes
The Matthew Buncombe prize for 
best overall performance in the 
MPhil degree was awarded to 
Robert Trueman (Fitzwilliam). 
The Craig Taylor prize for best
performance in Part IB was shared
between Zoe Johnson King
(Fitzwilliam) and Benjamin Gregory
(St John’s). The Part II prize went 
to Matthew Hasler (Girton).
“Throughout the second half of the
twentieth century Timothy Smiley 
gave lectures on logic at Cambridge
University. It is not an exaggeration 
to say that the lectures are a life-time
memory for many who heard them. 
A remarkably large number of those
students decided to pursue philosophy
as a profession and have gone on to
distinguished careers of their own: when
asked, they cite Smiley’s lectures as an
inspiration. … Smiley has displayed
unplumbable generosity towards
students and colleagues. Whether he 
is pointing a student towards a fruitful
area of research, or helping him see that
his current conceptualization is not yet
quite right; whether he is spurring on a
colleague with a unique blend of serious
challenge, honest encouragement and
teasing; whether he is meticulously
correcting draft after draft of a student’s
paper (literally dotting the i’s and
crossing the t’s), Smiley has done the
best he can to bring out the best in 
all around him. For five decades he and
his wife Benita have opened their home
to students who in a weary moment, 
or a moment of insecurity, could use 
a home-cooked meal and a laugh. A
small sample of those who are grateful
have put together this volume on the
many ways that good arguments
actually work”. 
So says the Preface to Professor
Smiley’s Festschrift, The Force of
Argument (Routledge, 2010), which
celebrated his groundbreaking
achievements in logic. Readers will
know many of the contributors:
Jonathan Lear and Alex Oliver, who 
also co-edited the volume, and Kwame
Anthony Appiah, Tom Baldwin, Jim
Cargile, James Doyle, Ian Hacking, Lloyd
Humberstone, Rosanna Keefe, Michael
Potter, Graham Priest and Neil Tennant.
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People
Professor Timothy Smiley at the presentation
of his Festschrift in Clare College, 15 January
2010. Photo: Geoff Durrant.
Festival of Ideas 2009
The Philosophy of Wine –
From Science to Subjectivity
Alexis J. Papazoglou, PhD student
Pre-empting, perhaps, the audience’s
scepticism, Professor Barry Smith
(Institute of Philosophy) assured us
that one can enjoy one’s passion for
wine while profiting philosophically
“at least until the second bottle”. 
What prompted Smith’s philosophical
interest in wine was a paradox – wine
critics claim that taste is subjective, yet
the industry of wine-making seems 
to rely on this not being so. On the
one hand, tasting wine involves a
subjective experience; one cannot
know how the wine tastes just by
analysing its chemical composition.
Novices and experts also widely
disagree about what they can taste in
a wine. On the other hand, producing
wine involves a number of choices
(grape variety, location, harvesting
time, aging process etc.) all with the
aim of producing a particular result. 
It is the accuracy with which wine
producers can make predictions
about what people will taste in the
wine that makes Smith believe that
taste is objective. The possibility of a
wine’s taste being a secondary quality,
however, was not considered despite
it being seemingly plausible. 
On the disagreement between
experts and novices, Smith argued
that this is due to the evaluative
nature of taste. We form judgements
about whether we like a taste, as well
as about what the taste is like. Experts
learn to focus their attention on the
latter, novices focus on the former.
Taste then, for Smith, is subjective
with regard to its evaluative aspects,
but not with regard to its descriptive
aspects. Apart from solving the initial
paradox, Smith claimed that thinking
about wine-tasting can have
philosophical value, for it brings out
the multimodal nature of the object
of taste: namely smell, touch and taste
are all involved in judging a flavour.
This makes it an interesting case-study
for philosophers of perception who
tend to focus on one sense at a 
time, such as vision. By the end, the
audience seemed convinced that, as
Voltaire put it, “taste invites reflection”. 
Invited speakers included: Derek
Bolton (KCL & Maudsley Trust), 
Lisa Bortolotti (Birmingham), Bill 
Fulford (Oxford & Warwick), Jules 
Holroyd (Cardiff ), Agnieszka Jawoska
(California Riverside), Jennifer Radden
(Massachussets), Jens Timmermann 
(St. Andrews), and Elizabeth Fistein, 
Jane Heal, Hallvard Lillehammer, and
Lubomira Radoilska (Cambridge). 
The conference was very well attended,
with participants from the USA, Japan,
South Africa, and many European
countries. The constructive spirit of the
event and the diverse background of the
participants contributed to fruitful and
stimulating discussions which not only
broadened our respective intellectual
horizons, but equally strengthened the
conceptual and methodological grounds
of our work. 
I would like to thank the conference
speakers, chairpersons, and delegates
whose valuable contributions were
instrumental to the success of this 
event. I would also like to acknowledge
the financial and administrative support 
I received from the Wellcome Trust 
and CRASSH. 
The conference is part of an ongoing
collaborative project at the Faculty of
Philosophy. Further information and
related resources are available at:
www.phil.cam.ac.uk/news_events/
autonomy_mental_health.html.
Autonomy is the focus of several major
philosophical inquiries. One of these
aims to establish the defining features 
of autonomous motivational states, 
such as proper formation and reflective
endorsement. It relates autonomy to the
concepts of rational agency and freedom
of will. Another approach explores the
question of whether autonomous
choices ought to accord with particular
values, e.g. self-respect. It identifies
covert forms of oppression and
elaborates on corrective initiatives. 
A third inquiry concentrates on the 
links between responsiveness to moral
reasons and effective control over one’s
life. It looks at fully developed agency
and clarifies its relationship to moral
responsibility. Furthermore, autonomy 
is a fundamental topic in medical ethics.
Yet its links to two related key concepts,
decisional capacity and mental disorder
are rarely given full consideration.
A conference on “Autonomy and
Mental Health” (7–8 January 2010,
University of Cambridge) provided 
a forum for constructive dialogue
between philosophers, psychiatrists,
lawyers, and practitioners whose work
relates to these intricate concepts. The
questions we addressed included: Does
the notion of capacity necessarily involve
evaluation? How does it relate to the
notion of autonomy? What are the
defining features of mental disorder? 
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Events
Visitors enjoyed wine and philosophy at the Festival of Ideas
Autonomy and Mental Health Conference
Lubomira Radoilska, Research Fellow
On leaving Cambridge, after dithering
about a bit – aspiring to be both an
exalted novelist and the next prime
minister but five, I joined the humble
world of advertising. Many will find 
the word ‘humble’ conjoined with
‘advertising’ oxymoronic, but in my
experience advertising folk are much
more humble than novelists or
politicians. With good reason you 
may say.
I had read philosophy (then Moral
Sciences) but had no wish to become 
a philosopher. Doubtless the Philosophy
Faculty felt the same way about me. 
Nor, on the other hand, did I wish to
squander all my hard won philosophical
learning. But I faced a grim reality.
Advertising is not a business where I
would be likely to find epistemology
immensely useful.
How wrong I was! I soon learned 
that advertising provides its practitioners
with a philosophically-based privilege
unknown to others. Advertising people
are blessed with the power to coin new
words which swiftly pass into everyday
usage: brand names. Poets, writers and
philosophers seldom invent new words.
Scientists do, but nobody uses their
words except other scientists. When 
did you last hear people gossiping 
about D’Alembert’s Principle at a 
cocktail party? Whereas people use
brand names all the time. 
Not all brand names are invented, 
but many are. Names like Panasonic,
but you will not find it so defined in 
any dictionary. 
Once a brand name has been
launched the advertiser will go to
strenuous efforts to control its meaning,
to ensure it continues to mean what 
he wants it to mean. This too is unique 
to brands. Nobody controls the
meanings of other kinds of word, 
nor would they even try. This is one
reason etymologists and lexicographers
have little interest in brand names. If 
we want to know what a brand name
means we must ask the public through
market research, rather than the
lexicographers. No lexicographer 
would seek to establish the meaning 
of a word via market research.
Most astonishing of all, once a 
brand name has been launched into 
the public domain it acquires value.
Brand names are absolutely the only
words worth loads of lolly. They can 
be, and are, bought and sold. Have you
ever tried to sell a word? Try selling
‘obfuscation’, or ‘prestidigitation’, or
‘bottoms’. No way. Nobody will buy
‘prestidigitation’ from you. Anyway it’s 
not yours to sell. On the other hand, if
you owned ‘Heineken’, ‘Harrods’, ‘Hovis’ 
or even ‘Harpic’, you’d be sitting on 
a fortune. 
Would I have understood the
peculiarities of brand names – and 
there are many more – without studying
philosophy? Almost certainly not. Has
this esoteric knowledge made me a 
pile of money? Almost certainly not.
Persil and Palmolive. Others, like 
Birds Eye, Gillette and Mars are the
personal names of the originators of 
the products. Yes, there was indeed a
Clarence Birdseye, a King Gillette, and 
a Forrest Mars. They branded their
products with their names in much 
the same way as a cowboy brands his
cattle, but for the opposite reason. 
The cowboy brands his cattle to deter
rustlers. In contrast, brand owners want,
as it were, to encourage rustlers. Brand
owners want people to recognise their
brands instantly, so they can easily
choose them, and then choose them
again and again – confident they will
always get the same quality and style 
of product for their money. Only the
daftest business people put their brand
names on shoddy goods, as branding
helps customers recognise inferior
products as easily as it helps them
recognise good ones. 
Brand names are a curious breed 
of noun, placed somewhere between
common nouns and proper nouns. 
A common noun, say ‘soap’, identifies 
a multiplicity of roughly similar things. 
A proper noun, or name, say ‘Ludwig
Wittgenstein’, identifies a specific,
singular entity. Yet ‘Palmolive’ is
absolutely specific – no other soaps 
are Palmolive, but it identifies a
multiplicity of soap bars. A proper 
noun refers to something unique; a
common noun refers to innumerable
similar things; a brand name refers 
to innumerable things which are
uniquely similar. 
The late John Wisdom showed that
nouns are predictive. If I say “Here is a 
bar of soap” you’ll know roughly what 
to expect. But brand names are more
than predictive: they are promissory.
They promise the purchaser the
particular experiences their meanings
encompass. And woe betide the brand
name which doesn’t deliver what is
expected of it. It will soon perish.
In addition to invented names 
and manufacturers’ names, there is 
a third category of brand names: 
Vanish, Fairy, Old Spice et al. These 
were existing words with well-
established meanings before
opportunistic marketing men 
hijacked them. So that nowadays 
‘Vanish’ means a washing product, 
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The Meaning of Harpic
Winston Fletcher
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Winston Fletcher CBE, read Moral
Sciences at St John’s (1955–58). 
His appointments have included
Chairman of the Advertising
Association and President of 
the Institute of Practitioners 
in Advertising. His most recent
publication is Powers of Persuasion
(Oxford University Press, 2008) 
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